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“NOT FOR HUMAN CONSUMPTION”: PRISON FOOD’S
ABSENT REGULATORY REGIME
Amanda Chan* and Anna Nathanson**
ABSTRACT
Prison food is poor quality. The regulations which govern prison food are subpar
and unenforceable by prisoners, due in large part to Sandin v. Conner and the Prison
Litigation Reform Act. This Article aims to draw attention to the dire food conditions
in prisons, explain the lax federal administrative law that permits these conditions,
highlight the role of Sandin v. Conner and the Prison Litigation Reform Act in curtail-
ing prisoners’ rights, and criticize the role of the private entity American Correc-
tional Association in enabling mass neglect of prison food. The authors recommend
that the Prison Litigation Reform Act be repealed, that Sandin v. Conner be overturned,
and that Food Service Manual standards be improved to provide prisoners with more
calories, more options, and more variety. Prisoners will be better positioned to enforce
food rights in the courts under the recommended regime.
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INTRODUCTION
Across the United States, prisoners are hungry and nutrient-deprived. When prison
officials fail to provide their inmates with enough sanitary food, prisoners face an
uphill battle in court. Larry Dancy, for example, was a federal prisoner1 in Indiana.2
In 2020, Mr. Dancy filed a pro se petition in the Southern District Court of Indiana
against the prison’s warden and the federal Food Services Administrator (FSA).3 Mr.
Dancy alleged that the prison’s food service area was “infested with rodents and that
food trays . . . [were] contaminated with rodent feces.”4 Further, Mr. Dancy alleged that
the warden and the FSA were aware of the problem but refused to correct it.5 As a
result, “Mr. Dancy suffered a serious foodborne illness caused by the contaminated
food,” but the on-site medical staff “failed to provide him with adequate medical
treatment.”6 Although the court allowed Mr. Dancy’s claim for injunctive relief to
proceed, the court dismissed Mr. Dancy’s Bivens claim for damages7:
The Bureau of Prisons is tasked with feeding approximately
150,000 inmates every day. The failure to maintain adequate
sanitation in one of its facilities will rarely be the fault of one or
even several federal officials. Instead, it suggests an imperfect
1 The Authors of this Article have chosen to use language as used by the organization
Jailhouse Lawyers Speak which denounces the terms “inmate” and “correctional facility” and
instead finds “prisoner” and “prison” to be more accurate. Jailhouse Lawyers Speak
(@JailLawSpeak), TWITTER (July 14, 2019, 8:35 AM), https://twitter.com/JailLawSpeak/sta
tus/1150383389868023808 [https://perma.cc/FS8A-VPGD].
2 Dancy v. Watson, No. 2:19-cv-00426-JRS-DLP, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40268, at *1
(S.D. Ind. Mar. 9, 2020).
3 Id.
4 Id. at *2.
5 See id.
6 Id.
7 Id. at *1. See generally Bivens v. Six Unknown Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)
(allowing civil actions against federal officials for Fourth Amendment violations).
Bivens
The Atlantic








borne Disease Outbreaks in Correctional Institutions—United States, 1998–2014
supra
1012 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 29:1009
considers explanations for the lack of enforcement of food regulations. Part VI re-
futes the punishment rationale for a low-quality prison diet.
This Article’s authors are prison abolitionists. The authors write with the under-
standing that the prison-industrial complex is a thriving network made possible by
racial capitalism. The poor food conditions are particularly alarming once contextual-
ized in the structural realities of the U.S. prison system—it is a tool and site of racial
oppression, especially of Black people. Black and Latinx people make up fifty-six
percent of the U.S. prison population, even though they only constitute thirty-two
percent of the total U.S. population.14 Black Americans are incarcerated at over five
times the rate whites are.15 In the opinion of the authors, after the abolition of slavery,
the modern prison system grew out of Black Codes designed to put formerly enslaved
people back in chains.16 Today, every level of the criminal legal system dispropor-
tionately targets Black people.17 For the authors, the issue of prison food law takes
on added significance because prison food contributes to a racial caste system of
access to proper nutrition.
Prison abolitionists often illuminate and critique how certain so-called “prison
reforms” work to strengthen the power, scope, and endurance of the U.S. prison sys-
tem.18 But when it comes to the basic necessity of food, poor food conditions are a form
of control the U.S. prison system exerts over incarcerated people, and improving the
food conditions would chip at this control. Furthermore, prison abolitionists also fight
for the survival and well-being of all people currently held in cages, in the here and
now. Incarcerated people, including those who are prison abolitionists, regularly de-
mand and organize for improved food conditions, highlighting the immediate impor-
tance of this issue to their lives.19 Thus, the authors, from a place of awareness of the
structural factors that make it nearly impossible to improve prison conditions, advocate
for policies that would give prisoners legal avenues to enforce improved food standards.
Readers who are skeptical of the fundamentals of prison abolition will find research
in this Article that supports the systemic improvement of the quality of prison food.
I. LITERATURE REVIEW
There has been little previous scholarship on administrative law governing
prison food. Most prior work has focused on Eighth Amendment challenges to food
14 Criminal Justice Fact Sheet, NAACP, https://www.naacp.org/criminal-justice-fact
-sheet/ [https://perma.cc/WX8P-J3SN] (last visited May 6, 2021).
15 Id.
16 ANGELA Y. DAVIS, ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE? 26–29 (2003).
17 Id. at 30–31.
18 ANGELA Y. DAVIS, FREEDOM IS A CONSTANT STRUGGLE 22 (2016).
19 See Prison Strike 2018, INCARCERATED WORKERS ORG. COMM., https://incarcerated
workers.org/campaigns/prison-strike-2018 [https://perma.cc/K6MJ-8UD6] (last visited
May 6, 2021).
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conditions in prisons rather than the administrative body of law itself.20 Overall, the
previous literature has put forth ahistorical understandings of prisons and reinforced
narratives about Black criminality and the lack of humanity of prisoners and, as a
result, has failed to truly grasp the dynamics at play in prison food law.
There are a few sources which give now-outdated overviews of prison food law.
In a 1996 student paper, Jonathan Wilan did not attempt to review all elements of
prison food law, but instead tracked U.S. prison food conditions from the colonial
era to the near past and focused on how prisoners’ religious dietary needs have been
treated in the law.21 He noted that, despite some changes in the controlling law, for
the last two hundred years, the low quality of prison food has been fairly con-
sistent.22 However, his most interesting contribution was to draw attention to the
administrative law around religious dietary needs in federal prisons.23 Given the
scarcity of administrative law around prison food, the existence of these provisions
is notable.
His paper also had some limitations. Wilan’s understanding of why people are
in prison and how they deserve to be treated is an illustrative example of a norma-
tive bias against prisoners that informs much of existing scholarship on prison food
law. He began the paper by declaring that “[p]risons and jails are for those people in
our society who have refused to live by the rules. They are for murderers and rapists;
thieves and prostitutes; drug dealers and drug users. Why then should . . . the food
that a prisoner eats bother the rest of us?”24 He also rhetorically raised the argument
that bad food as punishment might “act as a deterrent” and reduce recidivism.25 This
Article will challenge the ideas that prisoners are uniquely abhorrent individuals (who
do not deserve autonomous control of their diets) and that punishment is worthwhile
(and so that poor food conditions have a defensible punitive function). This Article
will explain why race is a crucial factor to understanding prisons and by extension
their poorly regulated dietary offerings.
In a 2005 student paper, Cyrus Naim presented a more comprehensive look at
the issue, first contrasting the relatively strong protections for non-prison food law
with the basically nonexistent protections for prison food law and then offering
theories for the difference in the level and type of regulation.26 His first theory was
that mediocre food is part of a punishment function of prison that is necessary for
20 See infra notes 26–44 and accompanying text.
21 See Jonathan Wilan, Regulation of Prison Food 3–5, 9 (Jan. 1996) (unpublished student
paper) (on file with the authors).
22 Id. at 3, 8.
23 Id. at 2 n.5, 10.
24 Id. at 1.
25 Id.
26 See generally Cyrus Naim, Prison Food Law, PRISON LEGAL NEWS (July 5, 2007),
https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/media/publications/prison_food_law_by_cyrus_naim_2
005.pdf [https://perma.cc/YDB9-HD6C].
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deterrence.27 His second theory was that prisoners do not have the political power
to bring about prison food regulations because prisoners, who tend to come mainly
from poor communities, derive core voting support from these communities, which
in turn have low voter turnout rates and prisoners are themselves disenfranchised.28
While Naim overemphasized the vote as the best indication of political power, he
notably brought class analysis to the prison issue. His third theory was that race may
be influencing the issue.29 But his understanding of racism was incomplete. Naim
framed racism as a problem of individual white people believing that “black criminals”
are “different” from them.30 Instead, this Article focuses on the concept of structural
racism: “A system in which public policies, institutional practices, cultural represen-
tations, and other norms work in various, often reinforcing ways to perpetuate racial
group inequity.”31 Naim noted that regulation of prison food is minimal,32 and that
Eighth Amendment lawsuits, now curtailed by the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA), were the only real oversight of prison food law.33
Other scholarship has delved further into why relying on these Eighth Amendment
lawsuits is a poor method of oversight. Michael McKirgan cited four issues which
render the judicial system an inadequate system to ensure prisoners with sufficient
food: the PLRA, the reluctance of courts to grant prisoners’ injunctions, the lack of
attorneys for prisoners, and the high requirement of proof for an Eighth Amendment
claim.34 Instead, he recommended turning to federal regulations as the only hope for
ensuring prisoners adequate food.35 He theorized that because the U.S. Department
of Agriculture already regulates public school food, it could also do the same for
prisons for little additional cost.36 McKirgan acknowledged that the “widespread dis-
enfranchisement of felons” as well as the “tough on crime” era of politics fails to
incentivize legislators to write and pass bills to address the nutritional needs of
prisoners, but he still surmised that prisoners’ food will likely only receive proper
regulation under “strict, interventionist legislation.”37 The authors admire the atten-
tion McKirgan paid to administrative law around prison food, but for reasons this
Article will explore, the authors believe he was too optimistic about the potential of
27 See id. at 12, 16.
28 Id. at 15–16.
29 Id. at 17–18.
30 Id. at 18.
31 11 Terms You Should Know to Better Understand Structural Racism, ASPEN INST.
(July 11, 2016), https://www.aspeninstitute.org/blog-posts/structural-racism-definition/ [https://
perma.cc/DDA3-TNYR].
32 See Naim, supra note 26, at 11.
33 See id. at 11, 13–14, 26–27.
34 Michael D. McKirgan, Comment, Under-Regulation in the State Prison Food System:
Consequences and a Proposal for Change, 9 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 275, 283–84 (2014).
35 Id. at 277, 290–98.
36 Id. at 290.
37 Id. at 300, 305.
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federal law to actually address the fundamental inequities of the U.S. prison system,
and, by extension, its food.
Similarly, Professor Alfred Aman claimed that administrative law should be used
to reign in human rights abuses in prisons that are heightened by privatization.38 He
advocated for a uniform Model Privatization Code that would deepen democracy by
creating new forums for the public to assess what public-private prison hybrids should
look like.39 His arguments focused mostly on private prisons with only passing men-
tion of the privatization of services within public prisons.40 He did not reference
existing administrative law around prison food and did not extend his analysis to
consider specifically what it could mean for privatized food services.41 Professor Aman
did pay at least cursory attention to race. Still, while he accurately noted that prisons
were extended after the abolition of slavery to maintain control of the labor power
of Black people42 and that Black people are both overrepresented in prisons and dis-
enfranchised from civil society,43 he did not analyze how race will impact the potential
of administrative law to address human rights abuses. He did not consider that the
essential racial function of prisons might be a barrier to the success of his suggested
reforms, preventing them from being implemented in any meaningful way. The authors
argue that any proposed changes must justify how they will overcome the anti-
Blackness of most of the actors who would enforce them, as well as the profit interest
in keeping marginalized populations in cages. Professor Aman did not prove that
there are pathways through which more rigorous administrative law provisions could
overcome the barriers to enforcement that he notes himself.
This Article will build on this previous scholarship, and attempt to correct its
deficiencies, by specifically honing in on existing administrative law procedures
around prison food and integrating an analysis of the racial dynamics of the criminal
system into this examination.
II. FOOD CONDITIONS IN PRISONS
The oatmeal and fruit were infested with worms, the macaroni filled
with bugs, the beans inhabited by weevils, and the corn meal sup-
ported a thriving population of meal-worms.
—Kate Richards O’Hare, 1923, quote from her memoir In Prison:
Sometime Federal Prisoner Number 2166944
38 See Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Privatization, Prisons, Democracy, and Human Rights: The Need
to Extend the Province of Administrative Law, 12 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD., 511, 511 (2005).
39 Id. at 529, 540, 549.
40 See id. at 513–14.
41 See id. at 511, 513–14.
42 Id. at 527.
43 Id. at 532–33.
44 KATE RICHARDS O’HARE, IN PRISON: SOMETIME FEDERAL PRISONER NUMBER 21669,
at 87 (1923).
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I couldn’t have known beforehand that ‘meatballs’ in fluorescent
gray sauce would be cause for excitement because they were the
best thing rolling out of the kitchen.
—Stephen Katz, 2016, who wrote about his experience in
a Michigan jail for Vice45
Prison food is often unsanitary, inedible, and inadequate for consumption, es-
pecially where private food contractors are in play.46 Prisons are often not transparent
and unwilling to allow visitors and reporters into their facilities.47 According to Pro-
fessor Andrea Armstrong: “The public has little idea what happens behind prison walls.
Prisons and jails are essentially ‘closed institutions holding an ever-growing disem-
powered population.’ . . . While we, as a society, may have participated in the reporting,
investigation, or prosecution of the crime, society is practically barred from evaluating
the punishment itself.”48
For this reason, the data and research available on the lives of prisoners is limited.
Much of the information available is inevitably anecdotal. But across ideology,
prison food scholars largely agree that prison food is of poor quality, poor sanitation,
and poor nutrition.49 Erika Camplin, a food writer and scholar summarized:
Food in prison is at its best underwhelming, and cruel at its
worst. It keeps prisoners in a place of overall malaise and dis-
satisfaction with regard to their mealtimes, so they turn to the
commissary where they are up-charged for a small bit of taste
pleasure—not a great return on investment ratio. Additionally,
the current state of prison food often creates tension, breeds cor-
ruption, solidifies hierarchy, and itself generates a host of overall
problems for these institutions.50
45 Stephen Katz, What It’s Like to Eat Some of the Worst Prison Food in America, VICE
(July 26, 2016, 4:00 PM), https://www.vice.com/en/article/ezq59z/what-its-like-to-eat-some
-of-the-worst-prison-food-in-america [https://perma.cc/J3XK-BRB9].
46 See Fassler & Brown, supra note 9; see also Randy Ludlow, Meal Contractor Aramark
Below State Standards at 7 Ohio Prisons, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, https://www.dispatch
.com/article/20140908/NEWS/309089851 [https://perma.cc/K3YZ-KT83] (Sept. 8, 2014,
10:14 AM); Tom Perkins, Empty Promises: Something Still Stinks in Michigan and Ohio’s
Prison Kitchens, CLEVELAND SCENE (Feb. 17, 2016), https://www.clevescene.com/cleveland
/empty-promises-something-still-stinks-in-michigan-and-ohios-prison-kitchens/Content
?oid=4705549 [https://perma.cc/4CCB-K6DS].
47 Andrea C. Armstrong, No Prisoner Left Behind? Enhancing Public Transparency of
Penal Institutions, 25 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 435, 462 (2014).
48 Id. at 436–37.
49 See sources cited supra note 46.
50 ERIKA CAMPLIN, PRISON FOOD IN AMERICA 87 (2017).
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Most of the bad prison food that makes the news is about private prison food
contractors such as Aramark.51 Aramark contracts with states to provide prison food.52
Although a state is not bound by federal prison administrative regulation nor other
states’ administrative regulations, states often model their own prison food policy after
the federal ones.53 Michigan repeatedly made headlines when it encountered systemic
problems in prison food with Philadelphia-based private food vendor Aramark.54 For
example, one Aramark employee fed prisoners actual trash.55 The Aramark employee
had thrown out leftover food, but upon realizing that there were more prisoners to
feed, the employee retrieved the food from the trash, reheated it, and served it to the
prisoners.56 Aramark also served Michigan prisoners cakes that had been partially
eaten by rodents.57 In Ohio, under contract with Aramark, inmates discovered maggots
in four prisons, which prompted state officials to launch a statewide investigation.58
In a federal lawsuit, sixteen prisoners from Kent County alleged that Aramark served
rotten chicken tacos and poisoned about 250 prisoners.59
Under Aramark reign, Stephen Katz was served breakfast at 4:30 AM, lunch at
10:30 AM, and dinner at 3:30 PM.60 Although this followed Michigan Department
of Corrections’ policy directive of no more than fourteen hours between breakfast
and dinner time,61 Katz recalled “persistent hunger.”62
Prisoners still go hungry even when Aramark and other private food contractors
aren’t to blame. Many prisons do not provide enough calories to their prisoners.63
51 See, e.g., Ludlow, supra note 46.
52 See, e.g., Perkins, supra note 46.
53 Marlow et al., supra note 11, at 1154.
54 See Katz, supra note 45.
55 Bob Johnson, Food in Trash Served to State Prisoner in Saginaw County: Aramark
Worker Fired, MLIVE, https://www.mlive.com/news/saginaw/2015/03/aramark_employee
_served_sagina.html [https://perma.cc/BNE7-FSC5] (Jan. 20, 2019).
56 Id.
57 See Kyle Feldscher, Aramark Worker Ordered Prisoner to Feed Inmates at Michigan
Prison Cake Partially Eaten by Rodents, MLIVE, https://www.mlive.com/lansing-news/2015
/03/inmates_at_mid-michigan_prison.html [https://perma.cc/J3DM-HGD4] (Apr. 3, 2019).
58 Jeremy Pelzer, Maggots Found in Four Ohio Prison Kitchens; Officials Launch Statewide
Investigation, CLEVELAND.COM, https://www.cleveland.com/open/2014/07/maggots_found
_in_three_ohio_pr.html [https://perma.cc/4VC2-PPEN] (Jan. 12, 2019).
59 John Agar, Inmates’ Rotten Chicken Taco Case Against Aramark, Kent County Heads
to Federal Court, MLIVE, https://www.mlive.com/news/grand-rapids/2015/04/inmates_rotten
_chicken_taco_ca.html [https://perma.cc/W4VP-P82B] (Apr. 3, 2019).
60 See Katz, supra note 45.
61 MICH. DEP’T OF CORR., POLICY DIRECTIVE: OFFENDER MEALS AND FOOD QUALITY
ASSURANCE 1 (2019), https://www.michigan.gov/documents/corrections/04_07_100_Final
_10-1-19_667504_7.pdf [https://perma.cc/5HUP-J3NW].
62 See Katz, supra note 45.
63 See, e.g., id.
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For example, prisoners of the Montgomery County, New York, jail filed a lawsuit
in 2014, alleging that prisoners were receiving only 1,700 calories per day.64 Calorie
intake was allegedly so low that one prisoner plaintiff lost twenty-four pounds in
five months and another lost ninety pounds in six months.65 The suit also alleged
“hair loss, bleeding gums and constant hunger.”66
In fact, calories are so scarce in prisons, ramen noodles have surpassed tobacco
as prison currency.67 Michael Gibson-Light, a University of Arizona sociologist, inter-
viewed almost sixty prisoners and staffers at a state prison and found that ramen
noodles served as the basis for an “informal economy.”68 Similarly, Gustavo “Goose”
Alvarez, an author of Prison Ramen: Recipes from Behind Bars, told NPR that the
noodles were “everybody’s staple in prison: No matter who you are, you’re cooking
with ramen.”69
Prisoners must rely on ramen available in commissaries to get their minimum
calorie intake; prison food is so inedible or low-calorie that prisoners resort to other
ways of tending to their hunger.70 One prisoner who worked in the state prison’s
kitchen told Gibson-Light that there were too many prisoners and the prison could
not afford to feed everybody—instead, the prisons straddle the calorie guidelines.71
Courts often hear prisoners’ pro se complaints of subpar food. Sometimes, when
the allegations are sufficiently stated and well-documented, the courts will deny
motions to dismiss against food quality complaints.72 For example, Leonard Hudson,
a federal prisoner, filed a complaint to the Western District Court of Pennsylvania alleg-
ing that the former FSA and Corrections Officer, Mr. Stauffer, fed insect-infested
food to the prisoners73:
64 Steven Cook, Lawsuit: Montgomery County Inmates Not Fed Enough, DAILYGAZETTE
(July 30, 2014), https://dailygazette.com/2014/07/30/lawsuit-montgomery-county-inmates
-not-fed-enough/ [https://perma.cc/8R6C-N2G5]; see also Jason Subik, Lawsuit Against
Montgomery County over Jail Food Now Class Action, DAILY GAZETTE (Aug. 30, 2018),
https://dailygazette.com/2018/08/30/inmate-lawsuit-against-montgomery-county-named-class
-action/ [https://perma.cc/AL4Q-NM9Z] (reporting that a ruling opened the door in the lawsuit
to form a class).
65 Cook, supra note 64.
66 Id.
67 Maria Godoy, Ramen Noodles Are Now the Prison Currency of Choice, NPR (Aug. 26,






72 See, e.g., Hudson v. Kennedy, C.A. No. 12-12, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126846, at *15–21
(W.D. Pa. July 26, 2013) (magistrate judge’s report, later adopted by Judge McVerry).
73 See id. at *2–3.
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One day . . . [Mr. Hudson] was unloading a truck when he noticed
“bugs crawling around on bags of incoming foods,” consisting
of “mostly 501b [sic] bags of cornmeal, pancake mix, farina and
other dry goods.” Plaintiff notified [a guard] . . . . Soon, Defendant
Stauffer appeared and instructed Plaintiff and his co-worker to
“wipe the insects off, throw any of the bags that were open in the
trash and stock the rest with the current inventory of food.” . . .
After a few days, Plaintiff noticed insects in the oatmeal, farina,
grits, and rice being prepared and served to the inmates.74
Often, courts throw prisoners’ cases out.75 For example, the Tenth Circuit granted
summary judgment against Michael Strope, a prisoner who alleged that his kosher
meals included wilted and rotten items.76 Mr. Strope alleged that “he was served salad
dressing that was not kosher,” salad that was visibly spoiled, rotten or moldy oranges,
and a “‘nasty’ carrot/cabbage salad.”77 The court ruled, “Whatever complaints Strope
may have voiced regarding the content, variety, and preparation of the kosher menu,
he has not shown that it failed to provide a nutritionally adequate diet.”78 Even though
Mr. Strope was a state prisoner, courts use the same analysis for constitutional rights
of prisoners under either federal or state detention.79
Karyn Turk, a former Mrs. Florida, made headlines when she pled guilty to stealing
her mother’s Social Security checks and served thirty days in Miami’s Federal Deten-
tion Center in early 2020.80 She told The Daily Mail that “[o]ne of the hardest things”
about her prison stint “was the quality of the food, including the fact [that] some of
[the] items were expired for more than a year.”81 Ms. Turk explained, “Canned fruit
were ages old and some cheeses expired last year . . . . There was often mold visible
on the bread and muffins. There’s no fresh fruits or vegetables outside of apples and
bananas, and the occasional lettuce.”82 Apparently, a kitchen worker had told Turk
that “she was forced to cook chicken marked ‘not for human consumption.’”83
74 Id. at *4–5 (citations omitted) (quoting from an affidavit).
75 See Margo Schlanger, Trends in Prisoner Litigation, as the PLRA Enters Adulthood,
5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 153, 162–63 (2015).
76 Strope v. Cummings, 381 F. App’x 878, 880, 884 (10th Cir. 2010).
77 Id. at 881 (quoting from the record).
78 Id. at 882.
79 Id. at 882–83.
80 Jose Lambiet, EXCLUSIVE: Former Mrs. Florida, Who Was Sent to Prison for Stealing
Her Dying Mother’s Social Security Checks, Dishes on Her 30-Day Stint, Revealing the
Women’s Unique Mode of Gossip, Homemade Sex Toys and Cell Orgies, DAILY MAIL, https://
www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-8208809/Former-Mrs-Florida-dishes-30-day-stint-prison




1020 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 29:1009
Ms. Turk “watched guards smuggle [in] . . . fruits, vegetables, particularly avoca-
dos, valued and rare because they are never served in meals, and candies.”84 She
stated, “Where you eat, you’ve got to cover your plate because dust is falling from the
ceiling.”85 Turk even heard rumors that the male inmates in the same prison had
protested the food quality by “defecating on their food trays.”86
Prison food lacks nutrition. “In many prisons across the US, inmates only rarely
receive eggs, dairy or meat and fresh fruit and vegetables are sometimes banned al-
together,” reported The Guardian’s Rupert Neate when he visited Ramsey County
correctional facility in St. Paul, Minnesota.87 “Instead nutritionists are called into figure
out ways of achieving states’ minimum calorie counts and vitamin and nutrient in-
takes via tubs of margarine and fortified mineral powders and supplements.”88
For example, Barbara Wakeen, the owner of Correctional Nutrition Consultants,
specializes in this practice, helping prisons meet nutrient requirements without addi-
tional funding—ultimately recommending “margarine, beans and fortified baking
powder.”89 Nutrient-fortified products were originally developed for “hospital patients
having difficulty eating solids but producers have found a lucrative secondary market
in correctional facilities.”90 Ms. Wakeen commented that she would “like to see every-
body get all of the food groups,” but because that is a challenge in prison, “[w]e
have all these wonderful fortified things.”91
And prison administrators stretch the fortified products far. Chandra Bozelko,
a formerly incarcerated columnist at The Guardian, reported:
[Prisoners] will feel hungry, because the meals are the worst com-
bination: high calorie and low satiety. For example, soups are
thickened excessively with starch and hot cereals loaded with
margarine to increase their caloric value. A half cup might provide
10% of an inmate’s daily intake, but it’s still only a half cup of
soup or cereal. Even inmates who have consumed three prison
meals want to supplement their daily intake with more food; it’s
the reason why so many inmates (particularly women) gain weight




87 Rupert Neate, Prison Food Politics: The Economics of an Industry Feeding 2.2 Million,
GUARDIAN, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/sep/30/prison-food-spending-budget
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ramen] has risen to prominence and become coveted when it used
to be low on the food chain.92
Ramen noodles are high in fat and incredibly high in sodium—one packet contains
over 1,500 milligrams of sodium, totaling about seventy percent of daily sodium in-
take.93 Yet prisoners are forced to eat ramen or go hungry. As a result, even if prisoners
do technically get their required calories, they still can remain in perpetual hunger
with very little recourse.
III. FOOD AS POWER
Prison food is not just a matter of unsatisfied prisoners. Food is also a means for
the carceral state and its actors to further control and exert power over the minutiae
of prisoner life and identity. For example, in 2014, Maricopa County Sheriff Joe Arpaio
made headlines when he used a “bread and water” diet to punish prisoners who re-
belled against Arpaio’s new policy of mandatory American flags in the jail cells.94
According to NBC News, “[t]he regimen actually is a baked loaf of ground-up fruits,
vegetables, milk powder, dough and other ingredients and, though it fulfills nutri-
tional requirements, is decidedly unappetizing.”95 BBC News noted the ubiquity of the
practice of using food as punishment for prisoners: “Nutraloaf. Disciplinary loaf.
Prison loaf. Special management meal. The loaf. The blended and often baked block
of food, served in some US prisons as a punishment for bad behaviour, comes in a
number of guises.”96 New York and Pennsylvania prisons and the Los Angeles county
jail all variously combine anything from “margarine, potatoes and carrots” to “rice
and oatmeal” or “vegetable protein [and] cabbage.”97
92 Chandra Bozelko, How Ramen Became the Unlikely New Symbol of Prison Neglect,
GUARDIAN, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/aug/22/ramen-unlikely-new
-symbol-of-prison-neglect [https://perma.cc/Z47D-WWFF] (Aug. 2, 2018, 2:32 PM).
93 Jake Wayne, Ramen Noodle Nutrition Facts, LIVESTRONG.COM, https://www.livestrong
.com/article/263692-ramen-noodle-nutrition-facts/ [https://perma.cc/X27Z-RQ7P] (last visited
May 6, 2021).
94 Tracy Connor, Sheriff Joe Arpaio Puts Inmates on ‘Bread and Water’ for Flag Dese-




96 Vanessa Barford, Is It Fair to Punish Prisoners with Horrible Food?, BBC NEWS
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This example illustrates the process by which the prison and its guards alienate
prisoners from their own physical bodies and their own identity as a person, not an
inmate. Professor Godderis explained that
[the lifestyle] inside of a total institution does not provide the
opportunity to make personal decisions about what and when to
eat, how the meals are prepared, or where to consume the food.
As a result, prisoners not only lose control over this personal,
self-defining ritual, but also over their own bodies. This process
of estrangement between self and body makes it difficult, if not
impossible, to maintain one’s unique identity—a process that
Goffman (1961) terms the “mortification of the civilian self.”105
Another prisoner participant told the story of how the prison handles oranges in
the prison:
You could buy a box of oranges but security is so big on that—
they want to know where every fucking peel is, you know? Cause
guys make brews out of them so they have a tendency to watch
for them. . . . [T]he reason I’m laughing about it is it’s comical
because it’s just so childish [pause]. It’s funny sometimes the
things they come up with.106
Food as terrain for retaliation is not uncommon. Barry Lamon, a state prisoner,
alleged in a complaint to the Eastern District Court of California that prison guards
“deliberately served him meals of only one third to one half of the regular daily
portions and that such meals were pan-scrapings, crumbs, remnants, and scraps rather
than full entrees and side dishes as served to the other inmates” as retaliation for
exercising his constitutional rights, such as filing a “request for an order of protec-
tion and seeking relief from violations of his constitutional rights.”107
As then-doctoral student Avi Brisman observed:
[S]pacing of meals allows prisons to use food as a source of
domination in two ways—as something that inmates intensely
crave (i.e., in the morning) and something that they might wish
to reject (i.e., lunch, served only a few hours after breakfast, and
105 Id. at 63.
106 Id. at 67.
107 Lamon v. Tilton, No. 1:07-cv-00496-AWI-DLB (PO), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119182,
at *4, *17 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2008).
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dinner, served only a few hours after lunch) but know they cannot.
Inmates must thus endure the physical discomfort of eating or
not eating when they would prefer the opposite, as well as the
psychological pain of losing the ability to choose when to eat.108
Food is always a field of control and power. For example, guards may promise
extra food to prisoners who commit acts of violence on the guard’s behalf, or prisoners
can bribe the warden for extra food.109 In contrast, prisoners at Alcatraz, the former
federal prison in California, received unlimited loose tobacco and three packs of cigar-
ettes a week, as well as 3,100 calories or more a day, far above the federal minimum
caloric requirement.110 The Alcatraz prisoners were therefore relatively docile, and
cigarettes did not have the bribing power that they usually enjoy in prisons.111
Angela Davis famously contended that the prison-industrial system is the
modern-day descendant of the institution of slavery.112 Davis would likely agree that
slaveholders used food as a means of control in similar ways that prisons today use
food. Frederick Douglass wrote how slave owners would often starve their slaves
but provide abundant alcohol and food once a year to distract enslaved people from
planning how to escape.113 Douglass wrote in his first memoir, “Our food was coarse
corn meal boiled. This was called mush. It was put into a large wooden tray or trough,
and set down upon the ground.”114 Rations consisted of spoiled or poor-quality pickled
pork, fish, and corn.115 One cannot help but notice the eerie parallels between Mr.
Douglass’s description and the descriptions that contemporary prisoners give about
their prison slop.
Some may believe that food as a means of punishment is a legitimate way to
control the behavior of prisoners. However, while the legitimacy of punishment as
a concept is beyond the scope of this Article, the authors urge readers to be careful
about presuming the legitimacy of food as punishment without proper context. As
Angela Davis argued, we must “disarticulate crime and punishment” by looking beyond
“the prison system as an isolated institution”:
108 Avi Brisman, Fair Fare?: Food as Contested Terrain in U.S. Prisons and Jails, 15
GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 49, 55 (2008).
109 Id. at 65.
110 Id.
111 Id. at 65–66.
112 See DAVIS, supra note 16, at 36–39.
113 Nina Martyris, Frederick Douglass on How Slave Owners Used Food as a Weapon of
Control, NPR (Feb. 10, 2017, 11:42 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2017/02/10
/514385071/frederick-douglass-on-how-slave-owners-used-food-as-a-weapon-of-control
[https://perma.cc/8M53-B4LE].
114 Id. (emphasis removed).
115 Id.
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[A] more nuanced understanding of the social role of the punish-
ment system requires us to give up our usual way of thinking
about punishment as an inevitable consequence of crime. We
would recognize that “punishment” does not follow from “crime”
in the neat and logical sequence offered by discourses that insist
on the justice of imprisonment, but rather punishment—primarily
through imprisonment (and sometimes death)—is linked to the
agendas of politicians, the profit drive of corporations, and media
representations of crime. Imprisonment is associated with the
racialization of those most likely to be punished. It is associated
with their class and, as we have seen, gender structures the punish-
ment system as well.116
Davis urges her audience to consider that punishment is not necessary and cer-
tainly, by extension, punishment through prison food is not necessary.117 While Sheriff
Joe Arpaio may assert Nutraloaf as a way of forcing his prisoners to respect the manda-
tory American flag policy,118 scholars such as Angela Davis would likely identify
it as a way of punishing people for being poor, Black, a victim of the larger political
agendas, and unfortunately, at the whim of profit motives of the powers that be.
IV. CURRENT FEDERAL PRISON FOOD REGULATION
It is clear that prison food is poor quality. It often leaves prisoners hungry for more,
at best, and poisons and injures and kills prisoners, at worst. This phenomenon begs
the question: What are the regulations which govern prison food? This Part explores
the intricacies of federal prison food policy in the BOP’s FSM.
We should first note that the FSM does not provide any new due process rights to
prisoners.119 The Supreme Court ruled in 1995 that prison regulations do not give pris-
oners an affirmative right under the Constitution.120 Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned:
By shifting the focus of the liberty interest inquiry to one based on
the language of a particular regulation, and not the nature of the
deprivation, the Court encouraged prisoners to comb regulations
116 See DAVIS, supra note 16, at 112.
117 Id. at 111.
118 Connor, supra note 94.
119 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, FOOD SERVICE MANUAL
(2011) [hereinafter FOOD SERVICE MANUAL] (explaining the BOP’s federal prison food
policies without any mention of prisoners’ rights).
120 See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483–84 (1995).
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in search of mandatory language on which to base entitlements
to various state-conferred privileges. . . .
. . . .
. . . [W]e believe that the search for a negative implication
from mandatory language in prisoner regulations has strayed from
the real concerns undergirding the liberty protected by the Due
Process Clause.121
Prisoners can no longer sue for enforcement of prison policy and regulations.122
Prior to Sandin v. Conner, courts interpreted prison regulations to instill affirmative
rights to prisoners under the Due Process Clause, but Sandin ended this interpreta-
tion, opting to focus rather on whether the deprivation of rights “impose[d] ‘atypical
and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison
life.’”123 In other words, the Supreme Court directed lower courts not to look to viola-
tions of prison regulations but to “the nature of the deprivation” itself.124 As a result,
prisoners are only able to challenge the food quality of their prisons under the Con-
stitution.125 This means that the FSM, outlined below, does not provide positive
rights to prisoners. Rather, it functions as a set of aspirational standards for prison
officials, instead of a set of requirements enforceable by the courts.
In fact, it appears that the FSM has little administrative bite—the manual does
not appear in the Federal Register.126 The BOP never submitted the FSM for a notice
and comment period and never formalized the FSM into a rule.127 For the most part,
courts defer to the discretion of administrative agencies under Chevron, which held that
courts must defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute.128
While some legal scholars have warned that Justice Neil Gorsuch’s appointment to
121 Id. at 481, 483.
122 See id. at 480–82.
123 Michael Z. Goldman, Note, Sandin v. Conner and Intraprison Confinement: Ten Years
of Confusion and Harm in Prisoner Litigation, 45 B.C. L. REV 423, 423–24 (2004) (quoting
515 U.S. 472, 483–84 (1995)).
124 Id.
125 Cf. id. at 424.
126 See Federal Register Document Search Results for ‘Food,’ FED.REG., https://www.fed
eralregister.gov/documents/search?conditions%5Bagencies%5D%5B%5D=prisons-bureau&
conditions%5Bterm%5D=Food [https://perma.cc/EKT3-M5UC] (last visited May 6, 2021).
127 See FOOD SERVICE MANUAL, supra note 119, at 1 (indicating approval by Acting Di-
rector Kane with no other mention of a formal approval process). See generally Notice and
Comment, JUSTIA, https://www.justia.com/administrative-law/rulemaking-writing-agency
-regulations/notice-and-comment [https://perma.cc/3H4R-BBSQ] (Apr. 2018) (providing a
high-level overview of the administrative rulemaking process).
128 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
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the Supreme Court bench may signal the beginning of the end for Chevron defer-
ence,129 most nevertheless agree that Chevron’s framework of statutory interpreta-
tion is extremely deferential towards administrative agencies.130
The BOP, under the supervision of the Department of Justice (DOJ), sets forth its
food safety guidelines in the FSM.131 Federal prisons must follow the guidelines in
the FSM.132 State and local prisons are not required to follow these federal guidelines,
though they often create their own regulations adapted from the BOP’s FSM.133 The
current version of the FSM is dated September 13, 2011, and was approved by the
Acting Director of the BOP, Thomas Kane.134 The BOP’s outlined objectives of the
FSM are as follows:
• Inmates will be provided with nutritionally adequate meals, prepared
and served in a manner that meets established Government health and
safety codes.
• Essential resources will be planned, developed, and managed to meet
the operational needs of the Food Service Program.
• Inmates assigned to the Food Service Department will be given oppor-
tunities to acquire skills and abilities that may assist in obtaining em-
ployment after release.
• Inmates will be provided with nutritional information that enables them
to determine and establish healthy eating habits that may enhance their
quality of life.135
According to the FSM, the BOP’s Assistant Director for Health Services super-
vises the Food Service Branch of the Health Services Division.136 This Division
“coordinates training, policy and program development for Food Service Programs.”137
129 E.g., Eric Citron, The Roots and Limits of Gorsuch’s Views on Chevron Deference,
SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 17, 2017, 11:26 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2017/03/roots-limits
-gorsuchs-views-chevron-deference/ [https://perma.cc/D3ET-DJKL] (articulating the roots
of Justice Gorsuch’s opposition to Chevron deference). But see Note, The Rise of Purposivism
and Fall of Chevron: Major Statutory Cases in the Supreme Court, 130 HARV.L.REV. 1227,
1227, 1237, 1242–43 (2017) (arguing that Chief Justice Roberts spearheaded erosion of
Chevron deference).
130 E.g., Nancy M. Modesitt, The Hundred-Years War: The Ongoing Battle Between Courts
and Agencies over the Right to Interpret Federal Law, 74 MO. L. REV. 949, 952, 957 (2009).
131 See FOOD SERVICE MANUAL, supra note 119, at 7–9 (noting in the table of contents
that “Food Safety” covers chapters seven through eleven, comprising over half of the sub-
stantive portions of the manual).
132 Marlow et al., supra note 11, at 1154.
133 Id. at 1154–55.
134 FOOD SERVICE MANUAL, supra note 119, at 1.
135 Id. at 2.
136 Id. at 10.
137 Id.
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The National Food and Farm Services Administrator (NFSA) directly supervises the
Food Service Program at the Central Office level.138 The Regional Food Service Ad-
ministrator (RFSA) also directly supervises the Food Service Program at the Regional
level.139 The FSA supervises the Food Service Department at the Institution level.140
A. Food Sanitation
According to a 2017 American Journal of Public Health study, prisoners suffer
from a higher risk than the general population for infection correlated with prisons’
features of “crowding, lack of sufficient hand-washing areas, poor hygiene practices,
and lack of sufficient training in sanitation and disease prevention for inmates.”141
To combat this phenomenon, the CDC recommends:
(1) requiring food service employees to wash their hands, (2)
prohibiting bare hand contact with ready-to-eat food, (3) exclud-
ing ill food service staff from working until at least 24 hours
after symptoms such as vomiting and diarrhea have ended, and
(4) requiring at least 1 employee in a food service establishment
to be a certified food protection manager.142
While the FSM requires handwashing and prohibits bare hand contact with ready-to-
eat food, it does not require either mandatory employee sick leave or certified
employees.143
Section 5 of Chapter 7 of the FSM covers “Health and Hygiene.”144 The manual
assigns the FSA, the Institution level’s highest ranking Food Service Department
employee,145 the responsibility of observing Food Service staff for “symptoms that
may indicate [the staff] should be precluded from Food Service work.”146 These
symptoms include “open sores, skin irritations, cold or flu symptoms, yellow eyes
or jaundiced skin, etc.”147
Chapter 7 declares that “[i]f inmates report, or are observed to have, [such]




141 Marlow et al., supra note 11, at 1150.
142 Id. at 1154.
143 Id.
144 FOOD SERVICE MANUAL, supra note 119, at 33–35.
145 Id. at 10. “The FSA has oversight and direction of Food Service functions in the
institution; ensures compliance with Bureau policies relating to Food Service; and performs
duties in the Standardized Position Description for Food Service Administrator.” Id.
146 Id. at 33.
147 Id.
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assigned Food Service work.”148 Further, “[t]he FSA ensures any inmate removed
from Food Service for medical reasons is cleared to return to Food Service work.”149
So the FSM does not mandate the CDC’s recommended twenty-four-hour rule re-
garding Food Service staff exhibiting diarrhea or vomiting.
The CDC also recommends that at least one of the Food Service staff be a certified
food protection manager, but the FSM does not mandate the same.150 Rather, the man-
ual places generous and lax supervision authority onto the FSA. For example, the
manual deems the FSA to be “responsible for food safety within the department” and
obligated to “monitor and maintain food safety during all periods the department is in
operation.”151 And while all Food Service employees must be “qualified” and “full-
time,” the FSM only requires “a working knowledge of the Food Service Manual.”152
B. Meal Frequency
The FSM mandates “three meals [must be] served each day, two of which [must
be] hot.”153 The manual does not dictate the specific times meals may be served;
instead, it offers one simple rule: “No more than 14 hours may elapse between the
evening and breakfast meals. Variations are allowed based on weekend and holiday
Food Service demands, provided basic nutritional needs are met.”154
The FSM allows for supplemental feedings as authorized by the Health Services
staff; the manual outlines snacks for both diabetics and those in need of more
calories.155 A “Preferred Snack,” meaning the snack option that is prioritized, if
practical, for diabetics is “1 cup [of] skim milk and 1 serving [of] non-sugar-coated dry
cereal.”156
C. Calories/Energy
The NFSA, RFSAs, and FSAs collaboratively review the National Menu an-
nually.157 All of the federal prisons are required to use the National Menu, which is the
“approved menu, recipes, and product specifications [to] be used for food procure-
ment, preparation, and meal service.”158 Every April, the NFSA conducts a survey
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Marlow et al., supra note 11, at 1154.
151 FOOD SERVICE MANUAL, supra note 119, at 32.
152 Id.
153 Id. at 18.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 27–28.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 17.
158 Id. at 16.
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of prisoners to determine eating preferences and requests input from prison wardens
“to ensure all Food Service staff have the ability to provide input into the menu
update process.”159 To plan meals, the NFSA takes into consideration:
• Meals contain a variety of nutrient-dense foods among the basic food
groups.
• Money, manpower, and materials required to produce the menu.
• Food flavor, texture, temperature, and appearance.
• Eating preferences of the population.160
The NFSA must also get approval of the updated menu by a Registered Dietician, who
must conduct a nutritional analysis “to ensure the menus consider the Dietary Reference
Intakes (DRIs) for groups published by the Food and Nutrition Board of the National
Academy of Sciences.”161 Notably, the Registered Dietician is required to consider
the DRIs but not required to follow them.162
The latest version of the Food and Nutrition Board’s DRI report is from 2006.163
It provides equations to calculate the caloric needs of adults.164 A male prisoner,
aged 36, at 69 inches, at 197.8 pounds, with one hour of sedentary exercise per day
has an Estimated Energy Requirement of about 2,816 calories per day, according to
the DRI report calculations.165
159 Id. at 17.
160 Id. at 18.
161 Id. at 17. See generally INST. MED. NAT’L ACADS., DIETARY REFERENCES INTAKES:
THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE TO NUTRIENT REQUIREMENTS (Jennifer J. Otten, Jennifer Pitzi Hellwig
& Linda D. Meyers eds., 2006) (providing recommendations for daily nutrient intake goals).
There is no “Food and Nutrition Board of the National Academy of Sciences.” There is a Food
and Nutrition Board under the Health and Medicine Division of the “National Academies of
Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine.” About the Food and Nutrition Board, NAT’L ACADS.
SCIS.,ENG’G,&MED., https://www.nationalacademies.org/fnb/about [https://perma.cc/7Y59
-QTZE] (last visited May 6, 2021). According to its website, the National Academies are “pri-
vate, nonprofit institutions that provide expert advice on some of the most pressing challenges
facing the nation and the world. [Their] work helps shape sound policies, inform public opinion,
and advance the pursuit of science, engineering, and medicine.” About the National Academies
Press, NAT’L ACADS. PRESS, https://www.nap.edu/content/about-the-national-academies-press
[https://perma.cc/83Y6-JP2K] (last visited May 6, 2021). The National Academy of Sciences
was established in 1863 by Congress. Academy History, NAT’L ACAD.SCIS., http://www.nas
online.org/about-nas/history/ [https://perma.cc/RAE5-EVVM] (last visited May 6, 2021).
162 FOOD SERVICE MANUAL, supra note 119, at 17.
163 See generally INST. MED. NAT’L ACADS., supra note 161.
164 See id. at 20–37.
165 Id. at 82–84. According to the Centers for Disease Control’s 2018 National Health
Statistics Report, the average man in the United States weighs 89.7 kilograms, about 197.8
pounds. Cheryl D. Fryar, Deanna Kruszon-Moran, Qiuping Gu & Cynthia Ogden, Mean
Body Weight, Height, Waist Circumference, and Body Mass Index Among Adults: United
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After approval, the NFSA updates the menu, recipes, and product specifications
accordingly and uploads the updates into a database by July 20.166 The updates go into
effect in October and the NFSA opens a portal on the database to collect concerns
from the staff regarding the National Menu.167
D. Nutrition
The FSM mandates that each prison’s FSA makes the nutritional information
of the food available to the prisoners.168 This is to help prisoners establish “healthy
eating habits.”169 But there is nothing in the manual which dictates how the FSA
must inform the prisoners of nutritional information.170
E. Religious Diets
The FSM mandates the provision of a “Certified Food Menu” intended for
prisoners who claim religious dietary needs.171 This menu must be certified by an
Orthodox Kashrut supervision service but is intended not only for Jews who keep
Kosher but also Muslims who observe a halal diet and for other religious diets.172 At
every meal where meat is served, prisoners participating in the program are offered
“a no-flesh protein option.”173 Notably, this section of the FSM is implementing a
BOP rule.174 In 1995, the BOP “amend[ed] its regulations on Religious Beliefs and
Practices,” proving for the creation of a “common fare” food menu that would fulfill
all common religious dietary needs.175 It is the exception to the BOP’s general
regulatory silence on prison food.
States, 1999–2000 Through 2015–2016, NAT’L HEALTH STAT. REPT., Dec. 20, 2018, at 2.
The average man is 69 inches, about 1.524 meters. Id. at 3. According to the BOP website,
the mode of the federal prisoner population age distribution is 36 years old. Statistics: Inmate
Age, FED.BUREAU PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/statistics_inmate_age.jsp
[https://perma.cc/53HY-3RUE] (Mar. 13, 2021). Assuming that a male prisoner is sedentary
except for one hour of “Low Active” exercise in a day, the Physical Activity Coefficient is
1.11. INST. MED. NAT’L ACADS., supra note 161, at 84. Altogether: 662 – (9.53 x 36) + 1.11
x [(15.91 x 89.7kg) + (539.6 x 1.524m)] = 2815.83991.
166 FOOD SERVICE MANUAL, supra note 119, at 17.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 18.
169 Id.
170 See id.
171 Id. at 23–24.
172 Id.
173 Id. at 24.
174 Wilan, supra note 21, at 15.
175 See Religious Beliefs and Practices, 60 Fed. Reg. 46,485, 46,485 (Sept. 6, 1995) (to
be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 548); see also Wilan, supra note 21, at 15.
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Much of the prison food litigation that has been brought is focused on First
Amendment religious freedom claims.176 Prisoners have challenged whether their food
adheres to halal rules under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act.177 The Sixth Circuit ruled in 2015 that vegetarian meals satisfy the religious
needs of prisoners who eat halal.178 But prison food issues related to religious needs
are beyond the scope of this Article, which instead focuses on internal prison reg-
ulation of prison food generally.
V. THE ROLE OF THE AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION
The FSM refers to multiple “ACA Standards” such as the Standards for Adult
Correctional Institutions, Performance Based Standards for Adult Local Detention
Facilities, and the Standards for Administration of Correctional Agencies.179 The
ACA is a “professional membership organization composed of individuals, agencies
and organizations involved in all facets of the corrections field, including adult and
juvenile services, community corrections, probation and parole and jails.”180 ACA Ex-
ecutive Director James Gondles, Jr., explains precisely why this private organization
is cited in a government agency’s standards of food service for federal prisoners:
Perhaps one of the American Correctional Association’s great-
est contributions to the field of corrections has been the develop-
ment of a national accreditation process. ACA performance-based
standards and expected practices address services, programs, and
operations essential to effective correctional management. Through
accreditation, an agency is able to provide an environment that
safeguards the life, health, and safety of the public, staff and of-
fenders while at the same time providing the necessary educa-
tion, work, religious, and rehabilitative opportunities that enable
an offender to prepare for successful reintegration into the com-
munity. Performance-based standards and expected practices set
by ACA reflect best practices and current relevant policies and
procedures and function as a management tool for over 1,300
correctional agencies in the United States.
176 See, e.g., Robinson v. Jackson, 615 F. App’x 310, 311–14 (6th Cir. 2015); Robbins v.
Robertson, 782 F. App’x 794, 801–03 (11th Cir. 2019).
177 Steve Siporin, The Kosher Con Game: Who’s Keeping Kosher in Prison?, 74 W.
FOLKLORE 58, 64–65 (2015).
178 Robinson, 615 F. App’x, at 311–15.
179 FOOD SERVICE MANUAL, supra note 119, at 4–5.
180 AM. CORR. ASS’N, MANUAL OF ACCREDITATION: POLICY AND PROCEDURE 6 (2020).
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This Accreditation Policy Manual is offered as a foundation
of policy and procedure that will enable correctional programs to
achieve their goals of providing the highest levels of effective-
ness and efficiency while accomplishing proven and meaningful
positive outcomes. It will provide guidance to participating pro-
grams, field auditors, and other interested parties.181
By its own description, the ACA is producing standards that correctional institutions
may follow.
The ACA’s book, Standards for Adult Correctional Institutions, describes its
purpose:
Accreditation, a process that began in 1978, involves approxi-
mately 80 percent of all state departments of corrections and
youth services as active participants. Also included are programs
and facilities operated by the Federal Bureau of Prisons, the U.S.
Parole Commission, and the District of Columbia. For these agen-
cies, the accreditation program offers the opportunity to evaluate
their operations against national standards, remedy deficiencies,
and upgrade the quality of correctional programs and services.
The recognized benefits from such a process include improved
management, a defense against lawsuits through documentation
and the demonstration of a “good faith” effort to improve con-
ditions of confinement, increased accountability and enhanced pub-
lic credibility for administrative and line staff, a safer and more
humane environment for personnel and offenders, and the estab-
lishment of measurable criteria for upgrading programs, personnel,
and the physical plant on a continuing basis.182
By its own description, the ACA is a body which creates standards in order to fend
off consequences and complaints of prison conditions by allowing a demonstration
of “good faith” attempts to keep the facilities up to the ACA standards and to fend
off lawsuits.183
A. The History of ACA Accreditation of Prisons
While founded in 1870, the ACA’s current accreditation method came out of the
1970s.184 At the time, the prisoners’ rights movement had had several victories in the
181 Id.
182 AM. CORR. ASS’N, STANDARDS FOR ADULT CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS, at xvi (4th
ed. 2003) (emphasis added).
183 AM. CORR. ASS’N, supra note 180, at 9, 41–42, 50–54.
184 See id. at 6, 10.
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courts, increasing judicial and public scrutiny on prison conditions.185 The ACA was
one of several organizations which concurrently created standards for prison con-
ditions in response to such victories.186 Many of the ACA’s standards promulgated
during this period were derived directly from court judgements.187 Prior to the 1970s,
ACA standards had “lacked direction”; in 1974, the ACA created a companion orga-
nization, the Commission on Accreditation of Corrections (CAC), to rectify this.188
The CAC revamped the ACA’s outdated standards, with over twenty percent of the
465 standards released in 1978 derived from specific court decisions.189 In 1978,
ACA accredited its first correctional institution.190
Specifically, around creating standards for prison food, ACA’s most direct com-
petitor was the American Public Health Association (APHA), which released the
first version of a book of standards in 1976.191 The APHA openly admitted that, like the
ACA, it was motivated by prisoners’ rights litigation, stating: “Not coincidentally,
in 1976 the United States Supreme Court ruled that ‘deliberate indifference to the
serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction
of pain . . . proscribed by the Eighth Amendment . . . .’”192 Regarding prison condi-
tions in general, the American Bar Association (ABA) and DOJ were also writing
standards for correctional institutions in the mid-1970s.193
Many scholars see these standards as serving to “help institutions avoid the em-
barrassment of judicial scrutiny and allow correctional institutions to have autonomy
from outside intervention.”194 Some have even said it was possible for courts to rely
fully on accreditation as evidence that the facilities are constitutional,195 while others
185 Jamie Harris, Social Movement Lessons from the US Prisoners’ Rights Movement,
SENTIENCEINST. (July 21, 2020), https://www.sentienceinstitute.org/prisoners-rights [https://
perma.cc/7M4H-CCQF].
186 See id.; AM. CORR. ASS’N, supra note 180, at 8.
187 David Ronald Ralphs, Evaluating American Correctional Association Accreditation





190 Id. at 24.
191 Correctional Health Care Standards and Accreditation, AM. PUB. HEALTH ASS’N
(Nov. 9, 2004), https://www.apha.org/policies-and-advocacy/public-health-policy-statements
/policy-database/2014/07/02/12/07/correctional-health-care-standards-and-accreditation
[https://perma.cc/FEN2-4Z9U].
192 Naim, supra note 26, at 23 (quoting AM. PUB. HEALTH ASS’N TASK FORCE ON CORR.
HEALTH CARE STDS., STANDARDS FOR HEALTH SERVICES IN CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS,
at xvii (2003)).
193 Ralphs, supra note 187, at 23.
194 Id. at 32.
195 Id. at 33.
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have contested this;196 this debate itself speaks to the fact that these private standards
are seen as in relation to court case law on prison conditions.197
The ACA bristled at organizations’ creation of competing standards and went as
far as to oppose efforts from the ABA and DOJ.198 However, the ACA was able to beat
out its competitors and become “the most powerful and prolific standards organiza-
tion in corrections” because of the funding and the institutional support of the Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA).199
The LEAA was a federal agency within the DOJ that existed from 1968 to 1982.200
It was created as part of President Lyndon B. Johnson’s “war on crime” to fund local
law enforcement agencies and crime initiatives.201 The ACA first received an LEAA
grant in 1974 to fund the creation of the ACA’s accreditation process.202 By 1982,
the ACA had received over two million dollars from the LEAA.203 The LEAA also
effectively lobbied for different states to rely on the ACA’s prison standards; in
1978, LEAA gave one million dollars to twelve states so they could estimate what
compliance with the ACA standards would cost.204 Instead of directly promulgating
administrative law around prisons, the DOJ funded the ACA to create a semblance
of such a code.205 It might at first seem counterintuitive that a federal program de-
signed with a “tough on crime” ideology would fund a regulatory system meant in
part to improve conditions in prisons. However, the ACA legitimized prisons to courts
and legislatures, helping to cement the role of prisons in U.S. society at the beginning
of a period when there would be a tremendous expansion in the scale of the U.S. car-
ceral state.206 Of the agencies vying to set these standards, the ACA was the one that
most directly positioned correctional facility officials as the first and foremost experts
on prisons (instead of turning to prisoners, judges, lawyers, or the general citizenry).
196 Id. at 35.
197 The Supreme Court has ruled that ACA standards do not establish constitutional
minima. Id.
198 Id. at 23.
199 Id. at 23–24.
200 See U.S. DEP’T JUST. NAT’L INST. JUST., LEAA 1970, at 1 (1970); Opinion, What the
L.E.A.A. Elephant Learned, N.Y.TIMES (Apr. 21, 1982), https://www.nytimes.com/1982/04
/21/opinion/what-the-leaa-elephant-learned.html [https://perma.cc/KEB8-4HFF].
201 Jay N. Varon, Note, Reexamination of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration,
27 STAN. L. REV. 1303, 1303–07 (1975).
202 Ralphs, supra note 187, at 23.
203 Id. at 24.
204 Id.
205 See id. at 23–25.
206 See NAT’L ACADS. PRESS, THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES:
EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 39 (2014) (“In the first decade, 1972 to 1980, the
state prison and jail populations each grew by about 60 percent. In the 1980s, the incar-
cerated population more than doubled in size . . . .”).
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A review of the current ACA Executive Committee biographies reveals that the
executives are former directors of various states’ departments of corrections or sheriff’s
offices.207 They hail from the same institutions that they are supposed to regulate;208
these executives create standards that are endorsed by the government. They have
been effectively tasked with setting much of the administrative standards for prisons
and correctional institutions, and yet, their professional careers are founded in operating
such prisons and institutions. Prison industry officials are regulating themselves.
The ACA is also rife with connections to the companies that profit from prisons; a
critic of the ACA even described its annual meeting as seeming like a “gathering of
major defense contractors.”209 Another critic has claimed that “the ACA depends on
corporations that exploit the expansion of the prison system and that ACA accredita-
tion helps private prison firms market their services.”210 Indeed, the private prison
firm Corrections Corporation of American (CCA) has been an early adopter and loyal
customer of the ACA.211 In 2000, when the ACA performed accreditations on only
28.39% of all U.S. adult correctional facilities, it accredited nearly 75% of CCA’s
facilities.212 Overall, “only 10% of government-run facilities are accredited while
44% of privately-run facilities are accredited.”213
The ACA standards are “primarily processual and formulaic.”214 Audits are
announced several weeks215 or even months216 in advance. Multiple scholars have
written that this allows facilities to write policies consistent with ACA standards
right before audits, without fully implementing them between ACA inspections;
critics have called this the “one-day shine” and the “accreditation roller coaster.”217
Thus, the existence of an ACA standard for prison food does not necessarily mean
there is an enforcement mechanism for that standard.
B. BOP’s Reliance on ACA Standards
The principle which guides Section C: Food Service of Standards for Adult
Correctional Institutions is that “[m]eals are nutritionally balanced, well-planned,
207 Executive Committee, AM.CORR.ASS’N, https://www.aca.org/ACA_Prod_IMIS/ACA
_Member/About_Us/ACA_Leadership/Executive_Committee/ACA_Member/AboutUs/E
xecutive_Committee.aspx [https://perma.cc/A5CK-SHQT] (last visited May 6, 2021) (click
“Executive Committee Bios” to access biographies at https://drive.google.com/file/d/1H72aT
2bYsQP0rpLMK5yIFsVk1l6rwXYC/view [https://perma.cc/KF6J-677V]).
208 See id.
209 Ralphs, supra note 187, at 34.
210 Id. at 37.
211 See id.
212 Id. at 26–27.
213 Id. at 37.
214 Aman, supra note 38, at 539.
215 Naim, supra note 26, at 22.
216 Ralphs, supra note 187, at 36.
217 Id.
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and prepared and served in a manner that meets established governmental health and
safety codes.”218
The FSM covers some of the standards in Section C, and Section C does offer
some additional guidance. For example, while the FSM does state that no more than
fourteen hours between the first meal of the day and the last meal of the day can pass,219
standard 4-4328 of Section C states that “at least three meals (including two hot
meals) are provided at regular meal times during each 24-hour period.”220
Standard 4-4316 of Section C requires:
[D]ocumentation that the institution’s dietary allowances are
reviewed at least annually by a qualified nutritionist or dietician
to ensure that they meet the nationally recommended allowances
for basic nutrition. Menu evaluations are conducted at least
quarterly by institution food service supervisory staff to verify
adherence to the established basic daily servings.221
Notably, this language slightly departs from the FSM’s language, which only states that
a Registered Dietician “considers” the DRIs from the National Academy of Sciences
Food and Nutrition Board.222
Because the FSM only lists Section C as a “Reference,”223 it is unclear to the public
whether the ACA’s standards cited as references are mandatory or are cited as part
of a bibliography. The “References” section includes both BOP policy guidance as
well as Food and Drug Administration (FDA) code and ACA standards.224 Is this to
imply that all are mandatory? The public citizen and reader cannot know.
Further, what is a reader to do when the cited ACA standards seem to be in con-
tradiction to the BOP’s regulation? For example, Section C standard 4-4322, which
is noted as “MANDATORY,” requires:
Where required by the laws and/or regulations applicable to
food service employees in the community where the facility is
located, all persons involved in the preparation of food receive
a preassignment medical examination and periodic reexamina-
tions to ensure freedom from diarrhea, skin infections, and other
illnesses transmissible by food or utensils; all examinations are
conducted in accordance with local requirements.225
218 AM. CORR. ASS’N, supra note 182, at 87.
219 FOOD SERVICE MANUAL, supra note 119, at 18.
220 AM. CORR. ASS’N, supra note 182, at 91 (emphasis added).
221 Id. at 88.
222 See FOOD SERVICE MANUAL, supra note 119, at 17.
223 See id. at 4.
224 Id. at 4–5.
225 AM. CORR. ASS’N, supra note 182, at 89.
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But the FSM refers to different illnesses: “open sores, skin irritations, cold or flu
symptoms, yellow eyes or jaundiced skin, etc.”226 Does this mean that Food Service
workers need not be screened for diarrhea in federal prisons? And does this mean
that federal prisons are required to follow regulations of its locality and such food
regulations are not uniform among all federal prisons?
And what if the ACA standard states something in the “Comment” section of its
standard and not in the actual standard itself? For example, ACA standard 4-4321,
which is also noted as “MANDATORY,” notes in its Comment that
[f]ood service personnel should be trained in accident preven-
tion, first aid, use of safety devices, floor care, knife storage, and
use of fire extinguishers. They should attend regular meetings to
discuss accident prevention and analyze major accidents to
prevent recurrence.227
Yet, the FSM has no mention of accidents, first aid, or fire extinguishers.228 Rather,
it lists as a “Reference” the Program Statement “P1600.09 Occupational Safety, En-
vironmental Compliance, and Fire Protection (10/31/07),” which does not regulate
food safety.229
This leaves open the question: To what “established governmental health and
safety codes” does the Standards for Adult Correctional Institutions refer?230 To the
FSM? To the National Academies? To the FDA? To the ACA itself, which is a private
non-profit and not a governmental body? Nothing seems established except for a few
scattered rules. Rather, the BOP rules imply and point to a body of “established . . .
codes”231 which does not exist. Those rules that regulate prisoner food, largely echoing
the ACA handbooks, are vague and undefined. There is no clearly established body
of food service code—at best, the FSM provides some basic guidelines but its
boundaries with other bodies of law and its obligatoriness are ambiguous.
The FSM refers also to Section C of the Standards for Administration of Cor-
rectional Agencies, which is a form that both the institution seeking accreditation
and the ACA accreditation officer use to evaluate the prison’s compliance with ACA
standards.232 Again, this form refers to the principle that “[m]eals are nutritionally
balanced, well-planned, and prepared and served in a manner that meets established
226 FOOD SERVICE MANUAL, supra note 119, at 33.
227 AM. CORR. ASS’N, supra note 182, at 89.
228 See generally FOOD SERVICE MANUAL, supra note 119 (lacking any mention of
accidents, first aid, or fire extinguishers).
229 Id. at 4.
230 AM. CORR. ASS’N, supra note 182, at 87.
231 FOOD SERVICE MANUAL, supra note 119, at 2.
232 AM. CORR. ASS’N, STANDARDS FOR ADMINISTRATION OF CORRECTIONAL AGENCIES
129, 142–43 (2d ed. 1993) (Appendix B provides the definition of a “Qualified Individual”
for the purposes of “Safety and Sanitation Inspections.”).
2021] “NOT FOR HUMAN CONSUMPTION” 1039
governmental health and safety codes.”233 The form has minimal space to note defi-
ciencies or noncompliance, though the form does require the agency to “[l]ist documen-
tation” if it evaluates itself as in compliance and to provide a “plan of action” if it
evaluates itself as non-compliant.234 This also allows the Visiting Committee, pre-
sumably from the ACA Commission on Accreditation for Corrections,235 to reject
the agency’s plan of action.236
This form looks like it could speak to the ACA’s stated goal of providing docu-
mentation of “good faith” in maintaining prisoner quality of life.237 It allows so little
space for agencies and the Visiting Committee to actually engage with the mass
structural problems with prisoner food, and yet it gives the sheen of bureaucracy and
process. It gives wardens something to point to when they are accused of mistreating
prisoners. It is a piece of paper that implies that prisons are following their duty to meet
the prisoner’s basic needs, but it is nothing more than a checklist provided by a private
party that has no legally binding status on the government.
C. ACA Standards in the Courts
ACA standards do not hold formal sway in litigation.238 Even a Lexis Advance
search for “American Correctional Association” only brings up 1,035 case results.239
The Supreme Court wrote in a footnote in Bell v. Wolfish:
Respondents’ reliance on other lower court decisions concerning
minimum space requirements for different institutions and on cor-
rectional standards issued by various groups [such as the Ameri-
can Correctional Association] is misplaced. . . . [W]hile the
recommendations of these various groups may be instructive in
certain cases, they simply do not establish the constitutional
minima; rather, they establish goals recommended by the organi-
zation in question.240
The ACA standards are thus norm-setting but not legally binding.
233 Id. at 129.
234 See id.
235 See The Commission on Accreditation for Corrections, AM.CORR.ASS’N, https://www
.aca.org/ACA_Prod_IMIS/ACA_Member/Standards___Accreditation/About_Us/CAC/A
CA_Member/Standards_and_Accreditation/SAC_Commission.aspx [https://perma.cc/6EXB
-ZHJV] (last visited May 6, 2021).
236 See AM. CORR. ASS’N, supra note 232, at 129.
237 See AM. CORR. ASS’N, supra note 182, at xvi.
238 See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 543–44 n.27 (1979).
239 LEXIS, https://advance.lexis.com/ (run a search for—including double quotes—“American
Correctional Association”) (last visited May 6, 2021).
240 See 441 U.S. at 543–44 n.27 (citations omitted) (citing an earlier edition of AM. CORR.
ASS’N, supra note 182).
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The courts usually use ACA standards for informative context for Eighth Amend-
ment claims. ACA standards seem to hold no definitive Eighth Amendment value.
In Lareau v. Manson, the Second Circuit explained that the trial court
considered correctional guidelines and standards from a number of
organizations . . . to inform itself of contemporary standards. . . .
For instance, the standards of the American Correctional Associa-
tion require that 60 square feet of cell space be accorded prisoners
spending no more than 10 hours per day in their cells and that 80
square feet be accorded prisoners spending more than 10 hours
a day in their cells.241
In this Connecticut case, the Second Circuit found that with respect to the prison in
question, “[T]he various guidelines [including the ACA standards] illustrate the glaring
disparity on even the most rudimentary square footage level between the conditions
in the [prison] and the conditions widely thought by knowledgeable bodies to be
essential.”242
The dissent wrote, “[T]he American Correctional Association’s Manual of Stan-
dards for Adult Correctional Institutions (1977), which is cited by the majority, is
clearly aspirational; the Manual expressly states that ‘[t]he standards reflect new heights
to reach, new programs to achieve, and a higher sense of humanity and decency.’”243
So the majority and the dissent disagree on the exact degree to which the ACA sets
norms—does the ACA delineate the bare minimum or does the ACA speak to largely
ambitious goals?
In Byrd v. Maricopa County Sheriff’s Department, prisoner Charles Edward
Byrd brought a challenge under the Fourth Amendment from a humiliating cross-
gender strip search.244 The Ninth Circuit ruled that Mr. Byrd was subjected to an
unreasonable search, reasoning that a report’s conclusions that cross-gender strip
searches heighten the potential for abuse and are extraordinarily intrusive in nature
were consistent with the ACA’s adopted standards.245
But violation of ACA standards does not always mean courts rule in favor of the
prisoner. In Casey v. Lewis, the Arizona Department of Corrections successfully con-
vinced the Ninth Circuit to reverse a lower court’s order that was in favor of plaintiff
state prisoners.246 The Casey dissent argued in a footnote, “I would be especially
reluctant to defer in this case to defendants’ ‘expertise’ because defendants’ practice
of prohibiting contact visits to prisoners based solely on their housing assignment
241 651 F.2d 96, 106 (2d Cir. 1981) (footnote omitted).
242 Id. at 107.
243 Id. at 113 (Friendly, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting an earlier edition of AM.
CORR. ASS’N, supra note 182).
244 629 F.3d 1135, 1136 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
245 Id. at 1142.
246 4 F.3d 1516, 1518 (9th Cir. 1993).
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violates the Standards for Adult Correctional Institutions issued by an association
of corrections experts.”247
It seems that ACA standards have even less sway with the Supreme Court. In
Hudson v. Palmer, the well-known Supreme Court ruling about a prisoner’s ripped
pillowcase, Justice Stevens footnoted ACA standards in his dissent, stating:
[I]t appears to be the near-universal view of correctional officials
that guards should neither seize nor destroy noncontraband prop-
erty. . . . I am aware of no prison system with a different practice;
the standards for prison administration which have been promul-
gated for correctional institutions invariably require prison officials
to respect prisoners’ possessory rights in noncontraband per-
sonal property.248
Justice Marshall expressed discomfort with the total disregard of ACA standards
in his Kentucky Department of Corrections v. Thompson dissent, arguing that the
prison’s own policies reference the ACA visitation standards and “[w]hen these
mandatory commands are read in conjunction with the detailed rules set forth in the
Commonwealth Procedures, it is inconceivable that prisoners in the [prison] would
not ‘reasonably form an objective expectation that a visit would necessarily be al-
lowed absent the occurrence of one of the listed conditions.’”249 But there is little
evidence that the Court will embrace Justice Marshall’s reasoning.
In short, courts may mention the ACA standards, especially if the court wants
to rule in favor of the prisoner and the prison is violating the ACA standards. But
the ACA standards have no legal bind and mainly serve to inform the courts of what
is presumed to be industry standard. This of course also means prisoners have no
recourse to challenge the ACA standards in court.
VI. PRISON FOOD AND THE PLRA
Prisoners’ litigation used to be a valuable tool for enforcing prison standards, but
this changed with the PLRA. The PLRA was passed and signed into law by Bill Clinton
in 1996.250 It decreases prisoner-brought litigation by requiring prisoners to exhaust
247 Id. at 1536 n.10 (Pregerson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
248 Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 551–52, 551 n.24 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
249 490 U.S. 454, 473–74 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted) (quoting id.
at 465 (majority opinion)).
250 Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1559 (2003); see also
No Equal Justice: The Prison Litigation Reform Act in the United States, HUM. RTS. WATCH 9
(2009), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0609web.pdf [https://perma.cc
/V25R-D5ST].
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prisons’ administrative grievance procedures before filing litigation and to pay filing
fees even if they are indigent.251 It also limits potential damages and attorney’s fees.252
The history of the PLRA’s passage illustrates how U.S. legislatures, by their struc-
tural design, tend to undermine prisoners’ rights, including regarding food. It was
passed as an amendment to the appropriations bill that ended the 1996 government
federal standoff.253 It received bipartisan support, and most disturbingly, little con-
gressional scrutiny.254 It was pushed through easily as a tort reform measure.255
Multiple scholars have drawn attention to how “tort reform” is a dog-whistle politics
used to mask a racially discriminatory agenda.256 Much like the “welfare queen”
myth, the tort reform trend stoked the fear of lazy, mooching (read: Black) people
hurting hardworking, successful (read: white) Americans.257 With a prison population
that is disproportionately Black, as well as the important role the “Black criminal” plays
in the white racial imagination, the tort reform craze was easily turned on prisoners.258
The PRLA pinpoints how little political power poor and racialized communities
have, and, resultantly, how the legislature is quick to cause such communities harm.
Stories about prison food played a key role in the PRLA’s passage. The National
Association of Attorneys General, which lobbied heavily for the PRLA, released a
distorted list of “egregious” prisoner litigation.259 Two of the stories that circulated
heavily were about a prisoner “suing for the right to chunky peanut butter” and a
prisoner demanding a salad bar.260
The peanut butter case in particular became something of an urban legend, with
critics of frivolous prisoner litigation being vague about whether “there were many
peanut butter cases or whether all of the reports refer to a single episode.”261 Politics
made it seem ridiculous to ask for salad when access to fresh produce and adequate
251 Schlanger, supra note 250, at 1559.
252 Id.
253 Id.
254 No Equal Justice: The Prison Litigation Reform Act in the United States, supra note
250, at 9.
255 See KITTY CALAVITA & VALERIE JENNESS, APPEALING TO JUSTICE: PRISONER GRIEV-
ANCES, RIGHTS, AND CARCERAL LOGIC 25 (2015).
256 See, e.g., Emily Gottlieb, Geoff Boehm & Joanne Doroshow, “Tort Reform” and Racial
Prejudice: A Troublesome Connection, CTR. FOR JUST. & DEMOCRACY 2 (2004); Joanne
Doroshow & Amy Widman, The Racial Implications of Tort Reform, 25 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL’Y 161, 161 (2007) (arguing that racial prejudice “lurks” behind the tort reform movement).
257 See Doroshow & Widman, supra note 256, at 164; Gottlieb et al., supra note 256, at 3–4.
258 See Doroshow & Widman, supra note 256, at 164; Gottlieb et al., supra note 256, at 3–4.
259 CALAVITA & JENNESS, supra note 255, at 26. Note that in this instance, attorneys
general, who might be another set of institutional actors called upon to intervene to improve
prison food conditions, led the push against prisoners’ rights.
260 Id.
261 Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws: The Pathologies of
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 47
DUKE L.J. 1, 19 n. 119 (1997).
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nutrition is a central crisis of prison food conditions. Jennifer Puplava wrote in the
Indiana Law Journal in 1997:
In a roundabout way, the debate over crunchy-versus-smooth
peanut butter helped bring about the Prison Litigation Reform
Act of 1995. The increasing concern with institutional reform has
caused an uproar over frivolous civil rights lawsuits brought by
inmates, coming to a head with inmates suing for “rights” such
as the enforcement of a preference for creamy instead of chunky
peanut butter.262
Proponents of the PLRA asserted other legends of prison food lawsuits, such as
an inmate who sued for one million dollars “because his ice cream had melted” and
an inmate who sued because his cake was “hacked up.”263 Political pundits harnessed
the persuasive power of these anecdotes and relied on the assumption that it is ob-
vious that prisoners do not deserve control over what they consume and especially
that they are not entitled to pleasure from their food.
Prisoners, however, pushed back against their complete dehumanization. For ex-
ample, the real peanut butter case was brought by Kenneth Parker after he was denied
a refund or exchange when his canteen order for peanut butter was filled incorrectly.264
In his own words, the lawsuit was more about self-autonomy than condiments: “It
was just the idea of them taking something from me . . . . If I didn’t file the suit, I
would have felt like I was punked out. Like you could take anything from me and
get away with it.”265 Minor changes in prisoners’ access to food have major psycho-
logical impacts on them, because prisoners’ domain of control over their own lives
has already been so reduced.266
Proponents of the PLRA also emphasized that it was necessary to maintain the
“[d]elicate [b]alance of [f]ederalism.”267 As Congressman Daniel Lungren argued
in a 2007 statement at a hearing reviewing what a decade of the PLRA has meant:
There is another underlying aspect of the PLRA which, in my
estimation, deserves our attention. The actions of the Congress
262 Jennifer A. Puplava, Note, Peanut Butter and Politics: An Evaluation of the Separation-of-
Powers Issues in Section 802 of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 73 IND. L.J. 329, 329 (1997).
263 Id. at 330 (quoting 141 CONG. REC. S14629 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995)).
264 Schlanger, supra note 250, at 1568–69, 1577–78.
265 Id. at 1578.
266 See Godderis, supra note 103, at 61–62.
267 Private Prison Information Act of 2007, and Review of the Prison Litigation Reform
Act: A Decade of Reform or an Increase in Prison and Abuses?: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th
Cong. 75 (2008) (statement of Rep. Lungren, Member, Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and
Homeland Sec.).
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in crafting the parameters of prisoner civil litigation have a direct
impact on the states and the operation of their prison systems.
This relationship of dual sovereigns entailed by our nation’s sys-
tem of federalism should be reflected in legislation affecting
state run penal institutions. Such deference is of particular im-
portance in light of the fact that about 95 percent of criminal
prosecutions occur at the state and local levels of government.
The punishment of those convicted of committing crimes within
the jurisdiction of the states is an integral aspect of the exercise
of the responsibility borne by them to protect the safety of their
citizens. A proper understanding of federalism entails a respect
for this aspect of the exercise of the police power.268
Rep. Lungren sees federal court oversight as infringing on states’ control of their
prisoners, claiming that “[i]n the period prior to the enactment of the PLRA, Con-
gressional acquiescence to the use of the federal courts by prisoners as a means of
disrupting the operation of their prison systems reflected a disregard for the constitu-
tional role of state governance.”269 There are a couple of clear issues with casting the
PLRA as being a federalist act. It blocks federal prisoners from seeking federal court
oversight and state prisoners from seeking state court oversight; neither of these
would threaten dual sovereignty.
It is notable that the specter of federalism is raised to defend the PLRA, espe-
cially because its actual connections to the principles of federalism are questionable.
Of course, much of the origins of federalist ideology were built around states’ rights
to allow slavery.270 This is significant because the prison abolition movement frames
U.S. prisons as being the successor of chattel slavery due to prisons’ structural corollar-
ies to the institution of slavery and prisons’ central role in the current oppression of
Black people in the United States.
The passage and continuation of the PLRA has also been aided by the prison in-
dustries. The ACA continues to support the PLRA, which it has affirmed in resolu-
tions by its membership in 2007 and again in 2016.271 The architect of the PLRA,
Sarah V. Hart, also has deep ties to the ACA.272 In 1998, just a few years after helping
268 Id.
269 Id.
270 See generally Earl M. Maltz, Slavery, Federalism, and the Structure of the Consti-
tution, 36 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 466 (1992).
271 AM.CORR.ASS’N, RESOLUTIONS 6 (Jan. 25, 2017) (“THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED
that the American Correctional Association continues to support the Prison Litigation
Reform Act . . . .”).
272 Rachel Poser, Why It’s Nearly Impossible for Prisoners to Sue Prisons, NEW YORKER
(May 30, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/why-its-nearly-impossible
-for-prisoners-to-sue-prisons [https://perma.cc/J2DM-DXY9]; Email from Executive Office
Team, ACA, to Anna Nathanson (Feb. 10, 2020, 10: 52 AM) (on file with author).
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write the PLRA, Hart became a Vice Chair of the ACA Legal Issues Committee.273
This suggests a mutual relationship of support and intellectual influence between at
least some of the politicians behind the PLRA and the prison industries.
Altogether, the passage of the PLRA is a great example of how a confluence of
ideologies and institutional actors, each shaped at some level by anti-Blackness, re-
sults in a facially race-neutral law that actually harms poor, Black, and Brown com-
munities. The impact has been to decrease prisoner litigation by an estimated sixty
percent.274 Prisoners lost one of their tools for seeking humane food conditions, and
they continue to suffer the consequences. Recognizing this, prison activists have con-
tinued to advocate for the repeal of the PLRA; the third demand of the 2018 Na-
tional Prisoners Strike was that “[t]he Prison Litigation Reform Act must be rescinded,
allowing imprisoned humans a proper channel to address grievances and violations
of their rights.”275 As prisoners know, the PLRA is a barrier to improving prison
food conditions.
VII. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
This Article recommends a three-step solution to the lack of administrative law
enforceable by prisoners: first, repeal the PLRA; second, overturn Sandin v. Conner,
either judicially or legislatively; and third, increase the nutrition, variety, and quality
of food standards.
A. Repeal the PLRA
The PLRA severely curtails prisoners’ ability to maintain any level of dietary
standards. It limits their ability to enforce both their existing Eighth Amendment rights
and the potential future protections they could gain from legislation. The PLRA
should be repealed; litigation used to be one of prisoners’ greatest tools for improv-
ing the conditions they live under, and it could be again if the PLRA is rescinded.
Organized prisoners themselves make this a central demand in their resistance.276
Senator Bob Dole himself admitted that the PLRA would help to “restrain liberal
Federal judges who see violations of constitutional rights in every prisoner com-
plaint and who have used these complaints to micromanage State and local prison
systems.”277 In other words, the PRLA was intended to stifle the voice that prisoners
have over the conditions of their own confinement.
273 See Email from Executive Office Team, ACA, to Anna Nathanson, supra note 272.
274 Poser, supra note 272.
275 Prison Strike 2018, supra note 19.
276 Id.
277 Andrew W. Amend, Note, Giving Precise Content to the Eighth Amendment: An Assess-
ment of the Remedial Provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 108 COLUM. L. REV.
143, 156 (2008) (quoting 141 CONG. REC. S14414 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of
Sen. Dole)).
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The congressional sponsors of the PLRA engaged in some questionable tactics
in advocating for their anti-prisoners bill:
[They] abused professional rhetoric. They offered misleading sta-
tistics. They told stories that combined into a woven narrative of
inmate abuse of the legal system, in which inmates purportedly
file frivolous grievances. They told only one side of stories, ig-
noring any prisoner’s legitimate facts behind the court filings.
They repeatedly labeled federal judges as “liberals” who were
willing to grant any inmate any frivolous request. They insisted
that tax dollars were thrown away on inmate filings costs. To top
all that off, they insisted that their audience, the other Senators,
should fear thousands of violent inmates, court-freed and roam-
ing the streets.278
According to Terri LeClercq, the congressional sponsors garnered support for
their bad bill using rhetorical performances instead of good policy:
The senators obviously felt the need to step outside the pro-
fessional standards of ethical speech, because the PLRA introduced
harsh restrictions for inmate petitions. Among other requirements,
it limited injunctive relief; it added an exhaustion requirement of
administrative remedies (yielding access through the local re-
quirements); it reduced or eliminated attorney’s fees; it offered
state judges the ability to screen, dismiss, and waive reply plead-
ings; and it required filing fees even of indigent inmates.279
Some may argue that Senator Dole attempted simply to correct the problem of
frivolous inmate petitions. LeClercq addresses this counteroffer:
Was a review of inmate petitions “micromanaging”? . . .
[Senator Dole’s] worry actually centered on the injunctions and
judicial oversight of appalling prison conditions that were re-
vealed by those petitions . . . . The Senate will save the nation
and its criminal-justice system by taking away its proper role in
prison oversight; and thus it came to pass.280
278 Terri LeClercq, Rhetorical Evil and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 15 LEGAL
COMMC’N & RHETORIC: JALWD 47, 48 (2018).
279 Id. at 49.
280 Id. at 53.
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Others have noted that the PLRA has made the boundaries of the Eighth Amend-
ment more flexible for prison officials—in other words, the PLRA lets prison ad-
ministrators play fast and loose with prisoners’ constitutional rights. Through the prism
of the PLRA, the Eighth Amendment may well look “something like a speed limit
which [prison officials] are entitled to push up against as closely as [they] can and
in regard to which there might even be a margin of toleration. . . . Repealing the
PLRA would neutralize [this] concern[].”281
“The PLRA is an extraordinary piece of legislation, both in U.S. legal history and
in the global context. It appears that no other country in the world has established
a separate and unequal system of court access that applies only to prisoners,” wrote
David Fathi, the Director of the National Prison Project of the ACLU Foundation.282
Fathi’s argument supports the idea that the PLRA likely leads to massive and sys-
temic violations of prisoners’ various constitutional rights, even beyond the Eighth
Amendment: “The PLRA has had a devastating effect on prisoners’ access to the
courts, and on the ability of the courts to enforce minimal standards of health, safety,
and human dignity for the 2.3 million prisoners in the United States.”283 Fathi warned
that if Congress can get away with the PLRA, there is little to stop Congress from
passing similar legislation for other politically unpopular groups.284
B. Overturn Sandin v. Conner
Prior to Sandin v. Conner,285 prisoners were able to sue over a violation of
prison regulations, such as those in the FSM.286 Philip Sbaratta argued that Sandin’s
narrowed approach to positivist law as an independent creator of
protected liberty interests, combined with its general refusal to
read the Due Process Clause directly, reduces prisoners’ due
process rights to an unacceptable level. [Sandin]’s holding renders
prisoners susceptible to virtually unlimited prison official discre-
tion over substantial interests that should invoke the Due Process
Clause on their own weight.287
281 Amend, supra note 277, at 144, 169.
282 David C. Fathi, The Prison Litigation Reform Act: A Threat to Civil Rights, 24 FED.
SENT’G REP. 260, 260 (2012).
283 Id.
284 Id.
285 515 U.S. 472 (1995).
286 See Philip W. Sbaratta, Note, Sandin v. Conner: The Supreme Court’s Narrowing of
Prisoners’ Due Process and the Missed Opportunity to Discover True Liberty, 81 CORNELL
L. REV. 744, 753 (1996).
287 Id. at 773.
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Sbaratta instead urged the Court to use a balancing test, like in Mathews v. Eldridge,288
to balance the interests of the prisoners and of the administration against each other.289
Sandin v. Conner has
negatively affected the ability of prisoners to make liberty interest
claims arising from intraprison sentences to more restrictive
confinement, usually involving long-term segregation. . . . Based
on the case’s vague language and its explicitly stated policy of
deference to prison officials, however, the lower courts have
applied Sandin in a manner that very much ignores the nature of
a prisoner’s deprivation as compared to the average prisoner’s
experience and overlooks the severe harms segregatory confine-
ments cause.290
Michael Goldman tested this argument against an analysis of lower court interpreta-
tions of Sandin, finding:
[T]hese cases reveal findings of fact supporting the critics’ pre-
diction that Sandin would lead to situations in which prison
officials could send prisoners to confinement for no justifiable
reason without any judicial oversight.
It is noteworthy and perhaps a little ironic that such consis-
tently harsh results arose out of a decision that failed to direct how
courts should analyze prisoner liberty interest claims.291
As a result, lower courts give the benefit of the doubt to prison officials and cite to
Sandin’s deference principle for the prisons.292
This is because Sandin v. Conner did not provide courts a test to measure atypi-
cality, significance, or ambiguity:
The new standard set forth by the Court for determining
whether a liberty interest exists in a prison setting is fraught with
ambiguity. Lower courts will struggle with the definitions of “sig-
nificant” and “atypical,” as well as “ordinary incidents of prison
life.” As a result, the Sandin Court’s objective of reducing the
288 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
289 Sbaratta, supra note 286, at 782–85.
290 Goldman, supra note 123, at 424.
291 Id. at 454–55.
292 Id. at 455.
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amount of prisoners’ rights litigation within the federal courts
will not likely be met.293
While these scholars speak of Sandin v. Conner generally, their conclusions apply
equally to systemic problems with prison food. Prisoners cannot sue to enforce the
quality and sanitation regulations which theoretically govern the prisons, and courts
seem to strongly defer to prison administrators when prisoners do file such chal-
lenges. Should Sandin v. Conner be legislatively or judicially overturned, prisoners
could more easily point out the improper behavior and rampant policy violations of
the prisons to the courts.
C. Require Higher Calorie Amounts, More Nutrition Options, and More Choices
for Prisoners’ Diets
Prisoners’ most common complaints about diet quality are hunger from insuffi-
cient calorie allotment, health consequences from a low nutrition diet, and boredom
from the narrow dietary variety.294 Higher standards are needed in each of these areas.
These could be promulgated for federal penitentiaries by BOP internal policies and
for state prisons by state prison bureau internal regulations or by state-level legisla-
tion. As a side benefit, these strengthened federal regulations would overshadow the
ACA’s ineffective, pseudo-regulation of prison food.
This could also possibly be brought about by a federal law that sets administra-
tive standards for both federal and state prisons. While usually it would be states’
purview to regulate their law enforcement under the constitutional scheme of federal-
ism, arguably the federal government could use its commerce power to intervene
here. Since there are both private and state-run prisons, we should look at prisons
as commercial entities that are sometimes owned by states instead of by corpora-
tions. Additionally, even public prisons often use private food service providers, so
prison food is even more clearly a site of commerce.
In Reno v. Condon, the Supreme Court upheld a federal law regulating the sale
of data by South Carolina’s Department of Motor Vehicles as a constitutional use of the
commerce power, holding that the federal law regulated the states as the owner of
databases instead of as states.295 Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion held that “[t]he
[federal law in question] regulates the universe of entities that participate as suppli-
ers to the market for motor vehicle information.”296 Similarly, here, federal legisla-
tion could regulate states as the owner of prisons and not as states.
293 Robert A. Surrette, Note, Drawing the Iron Curtain: Prisoners’ Rights from Morrisey
v. Brewer to Sandin v. Conner, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 923, 946 (1997).
294 See generally supra Part II.
295 See 528 U.S. 141, 143, 148 (2000).
296 Id. at 151.
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Without the PRLA and without Sandin v. Conner, such improvements to prison
policy could allow prisoners to sue the BOP to meet better dietary standards. Even
before the passage of the PLRA, courts have not found Eighth Amendment standards
for prison food conditions to be as broad as would be necessary to end starvation
and nutritional deficiencies for prisoners, so creating new statutory grounds for
prisoners to legally enforce their interests is crucial to actually improving prison
food conditions.297
CONCLUSION
One would certainly think that such things as nutritional standards,
cooking conditions, and sanitation rules would be handed down
from on high with strict enforcement that they were being carried
out and that safe food preparation conditions were in practice at
correctional facilities. The reality is that none of that is the case.
—Erika Camplin, 2017, quote from Prison Food in America298
This Article has drawn attention to the dire food conditions in prisons, explained
the lax federal administrative law that permits the conditions, highlighted the role
of Sandin v. Conner and the PLRA in curtailing prisoners’ rights, and criticized the
role of the private entity, ACA, in enabling mass neglect of prison food.
This Article recommends that the PLRA be repealed, that Sandin v. Conner be
overturned, and that FSM standards be improved to provide prisoners with more
297 Adjacent to the pragmatic goal of enforcement is the value-driven objective of demo-
cratic process. Professor Aman noted that the real potential of administrative law around
prison food is to deepen democracy:
[T]he role I envision for administrative law is not connected to regulation
per se, but to democracy. It is important to emphasize that what is at
stake are the values of public law—transparency, participation, fairness,
and accountability, as well as the kind of democracy that can flow from
all of these things. Various procedural approaches may be necessary to
ensure the realization of these values. It is the democracy-creating
values of the APA, . . . not necessarily the precise procedural devices
it currently employs [that are so essential] . . . .
Aman, supra note 38, at 525. “This will depend on the creation of the political spaces nec-
essary to raise important policy issues in a timely manner.” Id. at 520. He does not emphasize
creating these political spaces particularly for prisoners, but this is a necessary addition to
carry out his goals because prisoners are the only actors that can be depended on to reliably
raise the prison food issue. Additionally, prisoners are currently excluded from participation
in most of the democratic elements of our society, so putting them at the center of the new
democratic measures is uniquely fitting. The authors’ proposed reforms would accomplish
Professor Aman’s goals.
298 CAMPLIN, supra note 50, at 49.
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calories, more options, and more variety. Prisoners will be better positioned to enforce
food rights in the courts under our recommended regime.
However, prisoners do not currently have enough political power to repeal the
PLRA or to convince the Supreme Court or Congress to reconsider Sandin v. Conner.
The authors hope that future academic projects and grassroots organizing will ex-
plore different possibilities with the goal of pushing judges and legislators to provide
prisoners better food and accompanying enforcement rights.
